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Abstract: The basis of moral responsibility is the central is-
sue of Book IX of Laws, where Plato develops his theory of 
punishment, conciliating the Socratic thesis that no one is 
voluntarily bad (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός), with the practical ne-
cessity for a gradation of penalties, the latter being derived 
from the traditional distinction between voluntary and invol-
untary offences. Distinguishing two independent aspects of 
crimes – injury (βλάβη) and injustice (ἀδικί́α) – Plato argues 
that the former requires only restitution, whereas injustice 
calls for punishment, conceived as a measure to improve the 
soul, affected by disordered emotions or ignorance, causes 
of injustice. 
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Greek law generally tended to disregard the mental 
element of action, its intentionality or lack thereof, 
but this was certainly not the case in the homicide 
law. It seems that since an early age the Greeks dis-
tinguished between intentional and unintentional 
homicides, treating the former as worse. In Athens, 
since the seventh century BC, the homicide law of 
Draco1 explicitly mentioned that in case of unin-
tentional homicide, the murderer should go into 
exile and stated provisions about justified killings, 
such as self-defense (Gagarin, 2008, p. 93-99). Dur-
ing the Classical period, the distinction between 
voluntary (ἑκὼν) and involuntary (ἄκων) wrong 
was a central concept, which defines, for instance, 
if a killing should be considered justified or not 
and the court responsible for the trial. In fact, the 
Greek words ἑκὼν and ἄκων, and their correlatives 
ἑκούσιοs and ἀκούσιος, here translated as ‘volun-
tary’ and ‘involuntary’, have a broader sense and can 
also mean ‘intentional’ and ‘unintentional’, ‘willing’ 
and ‘unwilling’, or ‘with consent’ and ‘forcefully’. 
Besides the words ἑκὼν and ἄκων, the Greeks use 
other words to specify the presence or absence of 
a mental element, like ἐκ προνοί́ας (‘deliberate’ or 
‘with premeditation’) and ἀπροβουλί́α (‘without 
planning’) and μετ᾽ ἐπιβουλῆς (‘with planning’). 
Although, there was not a clear legal distinction 
between these terms, which could be subsumed 
under two broad categories.
In regard to the legal discipline of homicide in 
Athens at this time, the most important historical 
sources rely in Antiphon’s speeches and a few more 
by Demosthenes and Lysias. According to these evi-
dences, were considered involuntary, and so lawful, 
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cases such as accidental killings of a compatriot in 
athletic contest; in war or military training or of a 
patient by a doctor, as result of treatment. It seems 
that were also considered lawful: the killing of a 
nocturnal thief who enters the killer’s house; a man 
who kills an adulterer caught in bed with his wife. 
Concerning procedure, in general terms it could 
be said that the Areopagus was in charge of trials 
of voluntary killings of Athenian citizens, when 
the murderer acts with his own hands. Other cases 
were assigned to the ephetai, such as: unintentional 
homicide; charges against a person accused of plan-
ning a murder performed by someone else; killings 
of slaves or strangers (MacDowell, 1978; Todd, 2005; 
Yunis, 2005; Cohen, 2005b; Gagarin, 2008; 2011). 
In Laws, the Athenian Stranger – Plato’s voice 
in which is considered his last work – and his 
companions, the Cretan Kleinias and the Spartan 
Megillus, discuss the laws and political institutions 
they should decree to Magnesia, a new colony to be 
found in Crete. When the three elders begin to deal 
with the criminal law, a problem arises. Throughout 
the dialogue, Plato reaffirmed the thesis according 
to which no one is voluntarily bad (οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν 
κακός).2 First the Athenian mentioned that “every 
unjust man is unjust involuntarily”3 (V 731c2-3: πᾶς 
ὁ ἄδικος οὐχ ἑκὼν ἄδικος). Few pages forward, he 
returned to the same point, now saying that “no man 
can possibly be licentious voluntarily” (V 734b4: πᾶς 
ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄκων ἐστὶν ἀκόλαστος). In the Book 
IX, once more he states that “all bad men are in all 
respects involuntarily bad” (861d: οἱ κακοὶ πάντες 
εἰς πάντα εἰσὶν ἄκοντες κακοί́), revealing it was a 
central point in his conceptions about action, which 
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the lawgiver has to consider in his task of enacting 
criminal laws.
Confronted with the practical necessity to gra-
date the penalties, the Athenian acknowledges that 
this thesis – or rather, his conception about human 
action – raises a serious problem concerning the 
institution of criminal law. As he remarks, in all 
cities, all legislators then known recognized the ex-
istence of two forms of offences, the voluntary and 
the involuntary (861b4-5: δύο εἴδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων 
ὄντα, τὰ μὲν ἑκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια). So, it seems 
that in his role of legislator he could not adopt this 
distinction, lest he contradicts himself: having as-
serted that all offences are involuntary, how could 
he establish a criminal law that would suit penal-
ties according to the agent’s intention or the lack 
thereof? To overcome this problem, the Athenian 
must present to his companions a complete pun-
ishment theory, in order to justify the imposition 
of penalties to the criminal, conciliating his thesis 
οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός with the traditional distinction 
between voluntary and involuntary offences, which 
he admits he must adopt in his penal code. This is 
the key issue in Book IX of Laws, where Plato states 
the basis of legal responsibility in his late thought.4
Cleinias introduces the problem. He points out the 
fact that the same criminal offence (e.g. theft) presents 
variations that determine its greater or lesser gravity, 
thus calling for dissimilar penalties. As he says:
How comes it, Stranger, that we are ruling that it makes 
no difference to the thief whether the thing he steals be 
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great or small, and whether the place it is stolen from 
be holy or unhallowed, or whatever other differences 
may exist in a theft; whereas the lawgiver ought to suit 
the punishment to the crime by inflicting dissimilar 
penalties in these varying cases? (Lg. 857b). 
The Athenian does not reply directly to Cleinias’ 
remark; instead, after a long digression, he points 
to an apparent paradox relating to justice. As he 
says, when a just punishment is imposed, it is justly 
endured. However, since the penalty is shameful, it 
becomes ugly, and consequently devoid of beauty. 
Seeing that the punishment is just, its endurance 
should also be considered beautiful, since what 
is just should not be considered shameful. In this 
passage (859c-860c), the Athenian points out that 
the same object, man or action may have distinct 
predicates, which would sound contradictory to the 
majority of men.
This topic seems to be left aside by the Athenian. 
Actually, it will be resumed later, and Plato’s purpose 
here is to introduce the kind of difficulty with which 
the Athenian will be faced when approaching the 
core of Book IX. This preamble, crucial to a suitable 
understanding of the following pages, provides the 
key to grasp the kind of solution the Athenian has 
in mind to solve Cleinias’ objection.
Plato is clearly aware of the originality of his 
punishment theory and the difficulties it entails. 
In the following pages (860d-864c) the Athenian 
scrutinizes his thesis, dwelling upon his argu-
ments, in order to make them clear to his com-
panions. These pages are considered obscure, 
Silvia Regina da Silva 
Barros da Cunha, ‘Plato’s 
theory of punishment in 
book ix of Laws,, p. 45-75
50
nº 23, May-Aug. 2018
their interpretation being highly controversial, 
possibly reflecting few corruptions in the Greek 
manuscripts. For this reason, below they will be 
examined in five steps.
1 - 860c7-860e47 - The major principle re-
garding action and the problem it poses to 
the lawgiver: 
In order to face Cleinias’s remark – the inconven-
ience of imposing an equal penalty without regard 
to the possible variants of a same criminal offence 
– the Athenian, recalling his earlier statements, 
asserts that “all bad men (κακοί́) are in all respects 
involuntarily bad (ἄκοντες κακοί́)” (860d1-2). Then, 
he narrowly draws the consequences from this state-
ment. First, he says, “the unjust man (ἄδικός) is, 
indeed, bad (κακός), but the bad man is involuntar-
ily bad (κακὸς ἄκων)” (860d5). But, he continues, 
“it is illogical to think that a voluntary act is done 
involuntarily” (860d6-7: ἀκουσί́ως δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐκ 
ἔχει πράττεσθαί́ ποτε λόγον). Hence, it seems that 
acts involuntarily who commits an injustice, in the 
eyes of those who assume that injustice is involun-
tary, a conclusion the Athenian is forced to accept 
for the sake of his argument’s coherence, since he 
agrees that “all men act unjustly involuntarily” 
(860d9: ἄκοντας ἀδικεῖν πάντας).
In the following lines (860d9-860e4), the Athe-
nian, in order to clarify his opinion, stresses his 
disagreement with those who maintain that although 
men are involuntarily unjust, many commit voluntary 
acts of injustice.5 Presumably in this passage Plato 
had a particular opinion in view, most likely Aris-
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totle (cf. Robin, 1950, p. 966, n.2; England, 1921, p. 
393). In any case, the Athenian’s effort to elucidate 
his thesis, rejecting doctrines that might be similar 
to his, is worthy of note, and must be taken into 
account when interpreting the passage. 
In conclusion, it seems that Plato’s aims in this 
section are basically two: first, to shed light on his 
claim that all offences are involuntary, distinguish-
ing it from others similar thesis; and second, to put 
forward the puzzle his thesis creates for the lawgiver, 
that could not dismiss the distinction between vol-
untary and involuntary offences.
2 - 860e8-861d9 - The acknowledgement of 
the existence of two classes of offences and 
the resumption of the paradox concerning 
justice:
Faced with the puzzle his thesis seems to have 
brought him, the Athenian asks his companions 
if they will make a distinction between voluntary 
and involuntary offences (ἀκούσιά τε καὶ ἑκούσια 
ἀδικήματα) in the legislation they are working 
on, assigning heavier punishments to voluntary 
crimes and offences (τῶν ἑκουσί́ων ἁμαρτημάτων 
τε καὶ ἀδικημάτων). Or, on the contrary, if they 
should assign a single punishment to all of them, 
on the basis that there are no voluntary offences 
(860e8-861a2).
In view of his assertion that every injustice is 
involuntary, the Athenian could have simply cho-
sen to assign the same punishment to every type 
of criminal offence. Nonetheless, he dismisses 
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this solution, acknowledging that there are in fact 
“two kinds of offences, voluntary and involuntary” 
(861d4-5: δύο εἴδη τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὄντα, τὰ μὲν 
ἑκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια). Moreover, he must justify 
how these different degrees of punishment are to be 
applied, so that anyone may be able to appraise and 
judge the rightfulness of the punishment imposed. 
Therefore, and since, in his view, the traditional 
classification does not seem to be compatible with 
his major principle concerning human action, the 
Athenian must elucidate “how such acts are two-
fold, if the difference does not lie in that between 
the voluntary and the involuntary (κατὰ τί́να δὲ 
τρόπον ἐστὸν δύο, εἰ μὴ τῷ τε ἀκουσί́ῳ καὶ τῷ 
ἑκουσί́ῳ διαφέρετον ἑκάτερον), then we must try 
to explain it by means of some other distinction” 
(861d5-7).
At this point, the Athenian recalls the paradox 
concerning justice, referred above, and which had 
not been solved. Establishing a parallel with the 
situation he must face – explaining the difference 
between two types of offences –, the Athenian 
suggests that both are similar issues. Just as, in 
regard to punishment, to the masses there seems 
to be a clear separation between the just and the 
beautiful – which is solely apparent – they must 
examine whether there is any contradiction in the 
Athenian’s punishment theory, to whom wrongdo-
ings are always involuntary, but who, at the same 
time, acknowledges the existence of two classes 
of offences, commonly referred to as “voluntary” 
and “involuntary”. Maybe this incongruence is il-
lusory rather than real, existing only in the eyes 
of the masses.
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3 - 861e1-863a - The distinction between injury 
(βλαβη) and injustice (ἀδικία):
The first step in the Athenian’s solution to the 
difficulty he faces lies in the distinction he estab-
lishes between injury (βλάβη) and injustice (ἀδικί́α). 
He begins by introducing a new concept, the injury. 
As he says, “in dealings and intercourse between 
citizens, injuries committed by one against another 
are of frequent occurrence, and they involve plenty 
of the voluntary as well as of the involuntary” 
(861e1-3). Then, he warns his companions not to 
think of all injuries as acts of injustice and then 
regard the unjust acts involved as two-fold as if 
some were voluntary and others involuntary (861e6-
862a2). Indeed, he rejects the idea that “when a 
man harms (πημαί́νει) another without wishing it 
and involuntarily (μὴ βουλόμενος ἀλλ᾽ ἄκων), he 
acts unjustly though involuntarily (ἄκων ἀδικεῖν 
μέν, ἄκοντα μήν)”, and the law shall not declare 
such an act to be an involuntary offence (ἀκούσιον 
ἀδί́κημα) (862a3-5).
The Athenian rejects here the widely held view 
that all injuries are acts of injustice, and that these, 
in turn, could fall into two categories, voluntary and 
involuntary. The thesis rejected by the Athenian 
could be presented in the following diagram:
     VOLUNTARY
INJURY = INJUSTICE
     INVOLUNTARY
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Instead of this misconception, the Athenian asserts:
I will pronounce that such an injury is not an injustice 
at all, whether it be a greater or a smaller one. And, if 
my view prevails, we shall often say that the author of 
a benefit wrongly done (ὠφελί́αν οὐκ ὀρθὴν) commits 
an injustice. In effect, my friends, neither when a man 
gives things (ὄντων)to another, nor when, inversely, 
he takes them away, one should not proclaim, without 
further inquiry, such an act just or unjust; but only if 
a person benefits or causes injury to another with just 
character (ἦθος) and attitude (τρόπος) — that is what 
the lawgiver must look at. (862a5-b5)
Actually, the lawgiver should consider two phe-
nomena: injustice and injury. With regard to injury, 
he should seek to compensate it by all legal means, 
redeeming what was lost, restoring what was dam-
aged, remedying death and wounds, so as to turn the 
offender and the victim of each case of injury from 
a situation of discord to a condition of friendship 
(862b5-c4). On the other hand, in respect of unjust 
loss and gains (τὰς ἀδί́κους βλάβας καὶ κέρδη), 
when one commits an unjust act which results in a 
gain for someone else, every reparable case should 
be repaired, considering injustice a disease of the 
soul, that calls for cure (862c6-9).
The remedy the Athenian proposes for injustice, a 
pathological state of the soul, combines instruction 
and constraint. The noblest laws should make men 
hate injustice or, at least, not hate justice. To achieve 
this aim, the lawgiver can make use of any means 
such as actions or speeches, pleasures or pains, hon-
ors and dishonors, money-fines or money-gifts. And 
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to those who prove to be incurable will be assigned 
the death penalty which, besides profiting both the 
criminal and society, serves as a warning, so that 
others will not feel tempted to commit injustices 
(862d1-863a2). The Athenian conceives punishment 
as a tool for healing the criminal’s soul, compelling 
him not to commit any other injustice, or to do so 
less often. In conclusion, punishment is a therapy 
for the unjust soul and shall not be confused with 
the restitution of the losses caused by offences, but 
occurs in addition to it. 
In point of fact, there are two main lines of in-
terpretation of this passage. According to the first 
one, in the general kind “injury” (βλάβη), Plato 
would have distinguished two different types: the 
involuntary and the voluntary, the latter being the 
only one to constitute injustice (Adkins, 1960, p. 
305-306; Mackenzie, 1981, p. 200-204; Roberts, 
1987, p. 398; Saunders, 1968, p. 423). The second 
interpretation is that the legislator shall consider two 
distinct aspects of the criminal offence: injury and 
injustice. On the one hand, injury, a phenomenon 
that is purely external and objective, which are losses 
or gains occurring in the context of mutual relation-
ships between citizens. When a damage occurs, the 
legislator must make sure it will be repaired, restitu-
tion that shall be imposed regardless of the agent’s 
intention or state of soul. The legislator’s goal here 
is to assure social harmony. Besides injury, there is 
injustice, a subjective phenomenon that refers to the 
state of the agent’s soul, which may cause injury or 
benefit. Injustice must be corrected through pun-
ishment, the purpose of which is reestablishing the 
soul’s health. The fact that injustice causes not only 
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damages, but also benefits – as stated twice by the 
Athenian (862a7-8; 862c6) – seems to lead to the 
conclusion that injury and injustice fall into two 
separate categories. Furthermore, when detailing 
the criminal legislation, Plato never employs the 
expressions “voluntary injury” and “involuntary 
injury”, which suggests that the second interpreta-
tion is more accurate.
Graphically, the two possible interpretations of 
the Athenian’s posited thesis in this passage can be 
represented as follows:
INTERPRETATION 1
  VOLUNTARY – constitutes INJUSTICE
INJURY 
  INVOLUNTARY – does not constitute INJUSTICE
INTERPRETATION 2
    INJURY (objective category) –  
    requires restitution
ASPECTS OF THE OFFENCE
    INJUSTICE (subjective category) – 
    requires punishment
In any case, the distinction conceived by the 
Athenian between injury and injustice seems to have 
not elucidated the double aspect of offences and the 
difference between them. In truth, in the lines under 
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review, the Athenian’s intention is to make it clear that 
what determines the justice or injustice of an act is 
not the loss or gain that may come from it, but the 
character or disposition of the agent. Therefore, to 
those who understand that an injury may be voluntary 
or involuntary (Interpretation 1 above), it appears 
that somehow the only thing Plato did was to shift 
the difficulty, without effectively solving the problem. 
It is as if, by means of a simple word play, that which 
had traditionally been seen as “involuntary injustice” 
would come to be considered “involuntary injury”. 
Nonetheless, the reason why an action deemed in-
voluntary can also be considered voluntary remains 
to be explained. On the other hand, for those who 
understand that injury and injustice are independent 
categories (Interpretation 2), the passage in ques-
tion leads to the conclusion that injury and injustice 
would represent two aspects of wrongdoings. This, 
however, is still not satisfactory, since it does nothing 
to clarify the issue pertaining to varying degrees of 
punishment. Therefore, a second step is necessary to 
solve the challenge the Athenian faces.
4 - 863a3-863e3 - The causes of man’s faults 
and the various aspects of the voluntary 
and the involuntary:
Cleinias asks the Athenian for “a clearer expla-
nation respecting the difference between injustice 
and injury, and that between voluntary and involun-
tary acts, how these are blended of various forms” 
(863a5-6: τὸ τῆς ἀδικί́ας τε καὶ βλάβης διάφορον 
καὶ τὸ τῶν ἑκουσί́ων καὶ ἀκουσί́ων ὡς ἐν τούτοις 
διαπεποί́κιλται). Instead of a direct answer, the 
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Athenian makes a detailed account of causes that 
lead men to commit faults.
Anger (θυμός), the first one – be it a part (μέρος) 
or a state (πάθος) of the soul – is an innate pos-
session, contentious and hard to fight against, that 
convulses many things by its irrational force. The 
second cause, pleasure (ἡδονή), exerts its dominance 
through persuasion and compelling deceit. The 
third cause of faults (τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων αἰτί́αν) is 
ignorance (ἄγνοια), which can be divided into two 
categories: simple ignorance, which leads to lesser 
faults; or double ignorance, which is coupled with 
the illusion of wisdom. Coupled with weakness 
double ignorance leads to childish or senile faults; 
joined with strength and vigor, however, it can cause 
graver, more brutal faults. 
This passage could be represented by the follow-
ing diagram:
          ANGER
CAUSES OF FAULTS        PLEASURE           Simple
          IGNORANCE                           associated to weakness
         Double
             associated to vigor
As almost everyone says – adds the Athenian – 
between men, one masters anger and pleasure and 
another is mastered by them. However, nobody 
says that a man masters and another is mastered 
Silvia Regina da Silva 
Barros da Cunha, ‘Plato’s 
theory of punishment in 
book ix of Laws,, p. 45-75 
nº 23, May-Aug. 2018
59
by ignorance (863d6-e1). Still, these states of soul – 
anger, pleasure – as well as ignorance, “we say that 
all of them urge each man on a direction counter 
to his own will and for which he is attracted to” 
(863e2-3: πάντα δέ γε προτρέπειν ταῦτά φαμεν 
εἰς τὴν αὑτοῦ βούλησιν ἐπισπώμενον ἕκαστον εἰς 
τἀναντί́α πολλάκις ἅμα.).
The sentence at 863e2-3 reveals the sense in 
which we should understand the Athenian’s state-
ment that no one is bad voluntarily. States of soul, 
such as anger or pleasure, as well as ignorance are 
the factors that cause wrongdoings, which are invol-
untary because these forces act on the human soul 
compelling men in a way that is contrary to their 
own bent, their on will.
A corresponding idea can be found in the Soph-
ist (227d-229c), when the Visitor from Elea divides 
the vices (κακί́ας, 227d) of the soul into two catego-
ries. Just like the body may have two types of flaws, 
disease (νόσος) and deformity (αἶσχος), the soul 
also presents two distinctive kinds of vice. The first, 
wickedness (πονηρί́α), is a sort of dissent (στάσις) 
in the soul and resembles a disease, being character-
ized by the conflict between opinions and desires, or 
between courage and pleasure, or yet between reason 
and pain. The second, ignorance (ἄγνοια), is a kind 
of deformity, a disproportion (ἀμετρί́α) of the soul 
(228d). Like a physical deformity, it is a derangement 
(παραφροσύνη) of the soul, when it searches for the 
truth, but is unable to find it. In its turn, ignorance 
may be divided into two species, being the more seri-
ous called stupidity (ἀμαθί́α), the condition in which 
man presumes to know what in fact he ignores.
Silvia Regina da Silva 
Barros da Cunha, ‘Plato’s 
theory of punishment in 
book ix of Laws,, p. 45-75
60
nº 23, May-Aug. 2018
In comparison to Republic, these passages from 
Laws and Sophist reveal an evolution of Plato’s 
thought respecting the human psychology. In Re-
public, the injustice of the soul was regarded as a 
disharmony between its appetitive, impetuous and 
rational elements. In that context, well-founded 
knowledge would represent effective means of ac-
quiring virtue and, as long as the rational element 
was kept in charge of the others, the soul would 
become just. As his ideas evolved, Plato discerned 
a nuance that leads him to distinguish the internal 
conflict between reason and emotions from the pure 
and simple intellectual flaw, both causes of wrongdo-
ings. In the first case, Plato acknowledges that oc-
casionally emotions may be controlled or persuaded 
by reason. But even when this does not happen, and 
man is led to misbehave due to the dominance that 
anger, fear and pleasures exert over his soul, his 
reason is not entirely obscured: its voice can still 
be heard, and man, in greater or lesser degree, is 
conscious of having misbehaved, although he might 
be unable to resist the impulse of his emotions. On 
the other hand, because of its direct effect over the 
rational element of the soul, ignorance, in a way, is 
a more insidious cause of wrongdoings. Moved by 
ignorance, the reason’s voice will be unable to argue 
against error, and the man can not realize his fault.
If in the Sophist Plato was concerned with a clas-
sification of the causes of vice, the purpose of this 
passage of Laws is to expose the multiple meanings 
of voluntary and involuntary. Considering that the 
ultimate goal of human actions is a life in which, in 
its final reckoning, pleasure supersedes pain, it is 
possible to say that all wrongdoings are involuntary, 
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seeing that they result from states of the soul that 
compel man to act in a manner that is contrary to 
his final will and real purpose. Even in this sense, 
the Athenian proved that the involuntary has dif-
ferent hues, depending on whether the mistake re-
sults from ignorance or affections. In the first case, 
the wrongdoing is said to be involuntary because 
the individual’s reason is obscured by ignorance. 
In the second hypothesis, the involuntary refers 
to the moral impotence of reason in face of the 
compulsion of affections. The different meanings 
or degrees of voluntary and involuntary will prove 
crucial for enacting penalties.
On the other hand, it is possible to think about the 
intention and the will as referred to the immediate 
objective of an action. Then, it is possible to say that 
a particular act – a murder, for instance – is volun-
tary, meaning that it was deliberately committed, in 
contraposition to accidental or compulsory actions. 
So, according to the angle from which the agent’s will 
and intention are analyzed, the same action could be 
predicated in two different ways. In the strict sense 
of voluntary, which denotes the immediate objective 
of the action, it would be right to say that a man acts 
voluntarily, provided that he was not compelled to 
act, and the result of his action did not take place by 
mere accident or against his immediate will. At the 
same time, regarding the final purpose of human life, 
one can say that a man acts involuntarily if his actions 
results in more pain than pleasure or happiness.
Now it is possible to understand the function of 
the passage 859c-860c, where the Athenian mentions 
a kind of linguistic confusion, which seems to the 
Silvia Regina da Silva 
Barros da Cunha, ‘Plato’s 
theory of punishment in 
book ix of Laws,, p. 45-75
62
nº 23, May-Aug. 2018
multitude to be a paradox concerning justice. In fact, 
there is no contradiction in considering a certain 
criminal offence to be voluntary, meaning that the 
action was deliberately perpetrated by its author, 
while at the same time maintaining the thesis that no 
one does evil voluntarily. With this demonstration 
that the terms voluntary and involuntary have vari-
ous meanings, the Athenian leads his companions 
to conclude that there is no linguistic incoherence 
nor any logical conflict in the proposition upon 
which he bases his punishment theory, and the fact 
that, as a legislator, he adopts the traditional terms 
ἑκούσιοs and ἀκούσιος to differentiate criminal of-
fences that are intentionally committed from those 
that are unintentional or accidental. 
5 - 863e5-864c10 - A new explanation of the 
difference between injustice and injury:
As seen (Section 4 above), Cleinias had asked 
clarification of two points: the difference between 
injury and injustice; and the various senses of the 
terms voluntary and involuntary. Having examined 
the latter one, the Athenian now must attend to the 
former. He begins by defining what he understands 
by justice and injustice: “the tyranny of anger, fear, 
pleasure, pain, envy and desires in the soul, whether 
or not this results in injury, I term generally injus-
tice” (863e6-864a1). The following sentence says:
But if the opinion of what is the best (τὴν τοῦ ἀρί́στου 
δόξαν), by whatever way a city or private citizens think 
they can attain to it — if this has supreme authority 
over their souls and regulates (διακοσμῇ) every man, 
then, even if a failure happens (κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι),we 
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must say that is just everything done this way and 
whatever in each man is obedient to this governance 
is to be called just and best for the whole of human 
life, though most men suppose that such injury is an 
involuntary injustice. (864a1-8)
After this difficult passage the Athenian men-
tions once again the three forms of faults (864b1: 
τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων τρί́α εἴδη), now in a slightly 
different way. The first one involves pain (λύπη), 
and consists of anger and fear (864b3: θυμὸν καὶ 
φόβον). The second, of pleasures and appetites 
(864b6: ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν δεύτερον). The third, 
according to the Athenian, belongs to a distinct kind 
(τρί́τον ἕτερον): hopes and untrue belief regarding 
the attainment of the highest good (864b6-7: ἐλπί́δων 
δὲ καὶ δόξης τῆς ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὸ ἄριστον ἔφεσις). 
And here some authors suggest a corruption of the 
Greek manuscripts: in place of ἔφεσις (impulse) of 
the manuscripts, they think that the correct term 
would be ἄφεσις (loss). Whatever the case might be, 
there seems to be consensus that the third cause of 
faults the Athenian refers to is ignorance.
Recalling that ignorance, in turn, can be divided 
into three classes (cf. Section 4), the Athenian con-
cludes that there are five classes of faults, to which 
different laws should apply, of two main types – acts 
of violence that are openly perpetrated, and veiled 
acts that involve fraud –, so closing the explanation 
promised to Cleinias. Thereby, he gets back to the 
point that originated the digression, when deliberat-
ing on the issue of theft, he would have imposed a 
single punishment, that is, the restitution of twice 
the value of the stolen object. Now, considering the 
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possibility that such crimes might be committed by 
people who are under a state of insanity, such as 
senility, madness, or infantile behavior, a lesser pun-
ishment is prescribed for these cases: the restitution 
of the value of the stolen object. In the subsequent 
passages in Book IX, the Athenian will classify the 
different kinds of homicides into four categories, 
which will be examined below.
Even though the meaning of the sentence in 
864a1-8 is controversial and, as mentioned, a corrup-
tion of the Greek manuscripts should not be ruled 
out, the key expressions to understand the passage 
would be τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα and κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι. 
According to the commonly accepted interpretation 
of these lines, justice consists in the observation 
of a pattern that is merely internal, the voice of 
conscience. Out of the three causes of faults men-
tioned by the Athenian, the two first ones, θυμός 
and ἡδονή, would characterize injustice in the soul. 
On the other hand, faults caused by ἄγνοια should 
not be classified as injustice. τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα may 
refer to a true view as well as an equivocal view, or 
ἄγνοια. In the sentence, κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι would be 
elucidating that τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα might be a false 
view. Thus, if injustice consists in observing one’s 
own judgment regarding right and wrong, this would 
be equivalent to obeying the voice of conscience.6
This interpretation seems to conflict with lines 
863c1-d4, where the Athenian associates ignorance 
with more serious and brutal wrongs, and would 
represent a radical change in Plato’s thought. It also 
sounds incompatible with the passage from Book X 
in which Plato reserves the death penalty to the impi-
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ous, in spite of acknowledging that some might love 
justice and be thus sincerely wrong in their beliefs. If 
the traditional interpretation is correct, the impious 
who would be acting according to the voice of his 
conscience, would not have committed any injustice, 
and thus would not be deserving of any punishment.
In a thorough analysis, O’Brien (1957, p. 84-87) 
has proposed a new interpretation of the passage. 
Anger, pleasure and ignorance are expressions of 
injustice since, either directly through violence, or 
indirectly through the submission of the intellect, 
these three causes of faults compel man to act in a 
manner contrary to his own wellbeing. Therefore, the 
definition of justice in 864a1-8 could not include the 
false opinion, which implies ignorance. Τοῦ ἀρί́στου 
δόξα must be understood as “the conviction which 
has the best for its object” instead of “the opinion as 
to what is best”, and κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι would come 
to mean “even if there is a slipup,” rather than “even 
if some injury be done”. 
A third line of interpretation would be of Görge-
manns (1960, apud Saunders, 1968, p. 429-430) to 
whom τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα would be the opinion of 
the means by which the best may be achieved, since, 
regarding the objectives, ὀρθὴ δόξα would be presup-
posed, and κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι would mean that this 
opinion of the means might be wrong, leading to 
errors that should be deemed as just. In its essential 
aspects, this seems to be Stalley’s (1983, p. 157-159) 
interpretation as well, to whom τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα 
would be “the correct conception of the good”, and 
κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι, “if it happens to adopt the wrong 
means”. Analyzing Görgemanns’ interpretation, 
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Saunders (1968, p. 429-430) objected that the state-
ment that the δόξα must dominate the soul of each 
man seems to be much better suited to the correct 
opinion of the ends than to a practical judgment of 
the means. Moreover, the structure of the argument 
would indicate that the expression τὴν τοῦ ἀρί́στου 
δόξαν must be understood in an intellectual and 
theoretical sense, rather than a practical one. 
Yet a fourth interpretation is the one proposed 
by Saunders (1968, p. 430-432; 1991, p. 146-150), 
whose view is based on the structure found in lines 
863a3-864c2. When anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy, 
and desire dominate the soul, regardless of whether 
or not any injury may result, injustice takes place. 
On the contrary, as long as the correct moral view 
governs the soul, any action thus effected is just, 
even if this view is not entirely correct – this being 
the meaning of κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι in the passage. 
As seen, the sentence in 863e6-864a1 affords the 
most varied interpretations. Although O’Brien’s 
study did not remain immune to criticism,7 it has 
provided this difficult passage with an interpreta-
tion that is more coherent not only with Laws, 
but also with the Platonic doctrine as a whole. 
Actually, the critical point to the understanding 
of these lines seems to be that when the Athenian 
mentions τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα in his definition of 
justice at 864a1-8 he did not intend to assert that 
acts committed by ignorance could be considered 
just acts. In fact, that would be totally incongru-
ent with passage in 863b1-e4, where he states that 
θυμός, ἡδονή e ἄγνοια are all types or causes of 
faults, and that they are forces that drag a man 
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in a direction contrary to his own wish. This be-
ing so, the expression κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι refers to 
injury rather than opinion; and τοῦ ἀρί́στου δόξα 
denotes a man’s opinion, conviction, or reflection 
regarding what is best. Having settled what seems 
to be the most controversial point, it’s possible to 
understand the meaning of the passage as a whole. 
In order to comply with Cleinias’ request for a 
clearer explanation of the difference between injustice 
and injury, the Athenian firstly defines injustice as the 
tyranny of the emotions over the soul. In addition to 
anger and pleasure, previously mentioned as causes 
of man’s faults (863b), at this moment the Athenian 
includes fear, envy, pain, and desire. His point now 
is to make clear that emotions in general are forces 
capable of burdening the soul, driving man to act 
in ways that are contrary to his real intent and will.
Apparently forgetting ignorance, previously men-
tioned as the third cause of man’s faults (863c1-2), the 
Athenian presents his concept of justice: the supreme 
authority of the opinion of what is best over the souls, 
guiding the city and individuals. Everything that is 
done in this spirit shall be considered just, even if some 
injury is produced – and even if the multitudes should 
regard this as involuntary injustice. Actually, justice 
in the soul does not entail that injury will not occur 
and the men who have just souls are not exempt 
from suffering or causing injury. Seeing that there is 
no disease in this man’s soul, the legislator’s duty is 
simply to make sure that such injuries are repaired. 
Contrasting injustice – a phenomenon of the soul 
– and injury – a merely external fact – the Athenian 
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clarifies his notions, repeating that his doctrine di-
verges from that of the common man, to whom the 
injury incurred by the just man would amount to 
an act of involuntary injustice. And why the Athe-
nian did not mention ignorance in this passage? It’s 
possible to think that Plato’s aim here is to draw the 
attention to the yoke of the emotions over reason, 
governing the soul and directing human actions. This 
is precisely what constitutes injustice. Ignorance, on 
the other hand, the intellectual flaw that originates 
false beliefs, is the factor that allows emotions to 
guide the soul in place of those principles which, 
by nature, should reign over it: knowledge, opinion, 
and reason.
The focus of Laws is eminently practical: Plato is 
interested in the common man and how to conduct 
individuals and the city to a virtuous life. As the 
Athenian says, only a privileged few manage to con-
solidate prudence and true opinions, and they should 
consider themselves lucky who acquire these even in 
their old age (II, 653a). Therefore, realistically speak-
ing, in 864a Plato defines justice in terms of opinion, 
which, more than wisdom, is what we can expect to 
ultimately steer individuals as well as the city.
With the essential difference between injustice 
and injury having been duly settled, and in order to 
dissipate any doubts, the Athenian goes back to the 
classification of the causes of faults, which fall under 
the three categories afore mentioned: 1 – painful 
factors, consisting of anger and fear; 2 – persuasive 
ones, which include pleasures and appetites; 3 – ig-
norance, which can be subdivided into three classes. 
Evidently, the purpose of this repetition is to leave 
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no doubts that if injustice is a kind of disharmony 
or disorganization of emotions, be it painful or not, 
the lawgiver should consider that there are three 
factors that lead men to commit faults. 
Once the theoretical bases of punishment were 
established, the Athenian can detail the legal dis-
cipline applicable to homicide, imposing lighter or 
heavier penalties according to the severity of the 
offense, corresponding to the criminal intention, 
which results in the following categories. The first 
one consists of violent and involuntary homicides, 
by means of a direct action by the murderer, such 
as deaths in military training, public games or as 
result of a medical treatment (865a1-866d5). The 
second category covers the homicides in anger 
(θυμός), classified as intermediate between the vol-
untary and the involuntary, and which include two 
types: without previous intent; and by revenge, with 
premeditation (866d6-869e5). The third kind are 
voluntary and premeditated homicides, motivated 
by pleasure, appetites, and envy (869e6-873c1). And 
the last one consists of killings exempted of punish-
ment (874b6-d1). 
An extensive analysis of these dispositions is not 
the focus of this work. In a general approach, it may 
be noted that the Attic homicide law, both substan-
tive and procedural, is Plato’s major reference. In 
fact, in many relevant aspects, Plato upholds in his 
penal code the main features of Attic law, such as: 
1 – the relatives were responsible for the persecution 
of the killer; 2 – the hypotheses of involuntary and 
violent killings (865a1-866d5) and killings exempted 
of punishment (874b6-d1) were basically the same 
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portrayed by the forensic speeches as lawful; 3 – the 
legal distinction between planning and killing with 
one’s own hands; 4 – there were different legal con-
sequences between the killing of an Athenian citizen 
and the killings of slaves and foreigners. Probably 
the most striking feature of Plato’s penal code is the 
notion of homicide in anger, an intermediary class 
between the voluntary and the involuntary killing. 
If his theory of punishment is or not consistent with 
the criminal law he establishes for the fictitious 
colony of Magnesia is a controversial point.8
Conclusion
The solution devised by the Athenian to overcome 
the puzzle that challenged him – that is, how to con-
ciliate the thesis οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός with a criminal 
law that settles on a gradation of penalties, on the 
basis of the traditional distinction of voluntary and 
involuntary crimes – rests on the demonstration that 
the terms ἑκὼν and ἄκων can be used with different 
meanings. Strictly speaking, the Athenian’s line of 
reasoning could have dispensed with the distinction 
between injustice and injury. Therefore, the dem-
onstration that criminal offence has two distinctive 
aspects, injury and injustice, must have a function 
other than the first reading of these pages suggests.
Far from being an abstraction, devoid of practi-
cal consequences, the passages from Book IX under 
discussion evince Plato’s late ideas about the basis of 
moral responsibility, under an objective standpoint, 
that is, the perspective of the legislator who, when 
enacting criminal laws, must answer the following 
question: what justifies the imposition of punishment 
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upon the lawbreaker? The thesis οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν κακός 
is the basis upon which lies both his punishment 
theory and the structuring principle of his criminal 
laws. This thesis is combined with a new conception 
of crime as being composed of two distinct aspects, 
injury and injustice, which require different legal 
measures, as they are not necessarily associated.
In regard to injury, an external and objective 
phenomenon, considering that the citizens, in their 
mutual relations, deliberately or not, may cause dam-
age to each other, the legislator must make sure that 
these damages are repaired, seeking to compensate the 
injured part, so as to guarantee a peaceful social life 
in the city. On the other hand, injustice, a subjective 
phenomenon, is the evidence of a disease that infects 
the soul of the wicked. Although the criminal’s evil 
deed is ultimately perpetrated against his greater inter-
est and good, against his own soul – the reason why 
his perverse actions are said involuntary – this does 
not mean that he should go unpunished. On the con-
trary, punishment is the therapy administered by the 
legislator, aimed at healing the injustice of the soul. If 
the criminal’s faults are remediable, he is deserving of 
compassion above all things (731c-d).  Even in the case 
of irrecoverable criminals, deserving of wrath rather 
than compassion, and to whom Plato prescribes the 
death penalty, the punishment is considered to be in 
the best interest of both the unjust man and the polis 
(854e; 862e). In this respect, more than retaliatory, 
the punishment takes on a therapeutic character; its 
purpose is to heal a pathological state of the soul, thus 
representing a benefit for the criminal. Punishment 
still has another purpose, one that may be said to be 
educational or dissuasive: convincing others, through 
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the example set by the penalty justly imposed upon 
the criminal, that injustice is not advantageous. The 
punishment theory outlined by the Athenian in Book 
IX of Laws demonstrates how Plato managed to con-
ciliate the idea – consistently affirmed throughout his 
work – that evil is involuntary, with the legislator’s 
practical needs, thus providing a rational justification 
for the punishment.
Endnotes
1  According to the tradition, the first written laws in Athens were 
enacted by Draco in 621/0 BC. In the early sixth century his code was repealed 
at the Solon’s reform, with the sole exception of the homicide law, which the 
Athenians believed that remained unaltered during the Classical age. 
2  Besides Lg. this thesis, usually ascribed to Socrates, with slight 
different formulations, occurs in Prt. 352b ss; Grg. 468c, 509 ss; Men. 77d-e; 
R. 382a, 413a, 443e ff; Sph. 228c-e; Ti. 86d-e (Apud Robin, 1950, p. 783, n.2). 
3  All translations from Greek text by Bury, with minor changes.
4  The problem of the rational justification for the imposition 
of punishment has been first discussed by Plato in Prt. 324a-c. He was 
not alone in this matter; during the Classical age, other thinkers also 
advanced different punishment theories. Cf. Cohen (2005a, p. 170-190).
5  It is a problematic sentence and here I took into account the 
correction made by Shorey (1926, p. 404-405) to Bury’s translation. 
6  O’Brien (1957, p. 81-83) lists scholars whose interpretations 
largely coincide with Ritter’s, who, in turn, is regarded as parameter for 
the traditional interpretation: Stallbaum, Grote, Apelt, Gernet, England, 
Taylor, Grube, Levinson, Hackforth. In addition to these, we could also 
include Adkins (1960, p. 308): “If a man’s reason and desires are not 
in conflict, whatever his basic view of life, he is to be termed dikaios, 
provided that his actions are based on reason, not passion or desire.” 
Roberts (1987) also seems to accept the traditional interpretation. On 
the translation of κἂν σφάλληταί́ τι, cf. England (1921, N. 864a4, p. 403).
7  Saunders, 1968, p. 429. For a more recent analysis of these 
passages, cf. Weiss, 2006. According to Trelawny-Cassity, 2010, these 
two are the best commentaries on Book IX of Laws.
8  Cf. Trelany-Cassity (2010) for a more recent view on this topic.
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